2.2 THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

2.2 THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

Even if for the sake of argument, we concede that observation statements can be made in a safe and reliable way, the third premise on the reliability of induction is still fatally flawed. According to the naive inductivists account, scientific laws can be derived in a safe and reliable way by inductive inferences from observation statements with an appeal to the so called principle of induction. This principle goes something like this:

"If a large number of A's have been observed to possess the proprty B without exception then all A's possess property B".

The obvious question that immediately comes to mind is: how can this principle be justified ? It is almost a trivial remark to note that this principle has no secure logical support. We cannot justify it on the basis of logic. Inductive Arguments are not logically valid arguments. To see this more explicitly consider the philosopher's favorite example :

"All ravens are black".

This is an inductive inference made on the basis of a large number of ravens at different times. However it is still logically possible that the next raven observed will turn out to be white, thus invalidating the conclusion arrived at on the basis of the principle of induction.

A second possibility is to try to justify the inductive procedure by an appeal to experience. The argument runs something like this :

"The principle of induction has been found to work successfully on many occasions; therefore the principle of induction always works."

However, this is itself an inductive inference; hence the argument is circular and therefore insubstantial. In addition to the problem of justification, further difficulties arise out of the vagueness of the requirement for a “large number" of cases. How large is "large"? Should a metal be heated a 100 times before it is concluded that metals always expand when heated? Whatever answer we give there is still room for doubt that in the next instance a contradiction can be produced. This is a very difficult problem to overcome, and although a few attempts have been made, such as the recourse to probability, there has been no satisfactory resolution.

In fact, justifying the probabilistic version of the principle of induction itself involves the same circularity problem as before. In addition it has other problems of its own stemming from the definition of probability. Just as one cannot arrive at laws and theories purely by inductive inference from observations, one also cannot "prove" a theory by an appeal to experimental success. For such a claim would involve an argument like this:

“Theory T has been tested on many occasions and has passed the tests without exception; therefore theory T will pass all future tests."

This clearly makes use of the principle of induction and thus one runs into the same kind of difficulties as mentioned above. It should be completely obvious by now that there is no way of "proving" a theory by the naive inductivist procedure as advocated by the die-hard positivist. Neither can one establish a theory as being even "probably true" by an appeal to experiment, for this leaves one with deep mathematical difficulties associated with the meaning of probability in this context. What one can do, however, is to disprove a theory by means of a contradicting observation. For example, the observation "Here is a white raven!" disproves or falsifies the "theory" that "All ravens are black". In other words, the conclusion "All ravens are not black" follows logically from the premise "Here is a white raven". This logically point lies at the heart of the falsificationist's account of science: Scientific laws and theories cannot be proved but they can be falsified. Science progresses by guesses in the form of hypotheses and their falsification, i.e. by conjectures and refutations, to use Popper's terminology. While Popper's account is too simplistic on certain points the idea of theories being falsifiable is a very important concept, which he took as a criterion for scientific theories. It is simply a logical point and is all that we will need to use from Popper's theory to overthrow the mundaner's faulty perspective on scientific truth and "established theories".

Let us make these points clear by means of an example from the history of physics. For two centuries Newton's theory of Mechanics had enormous success in explaining known experimental facts as well as predicting new facts, such as the presence of the planet Neptune. After a while no one had any reason to doubt the validity of Newtonian Mechanics as it had passed innumerable tests over a considerable period of time. Yet, at the turn of the last century, it did run into conflict with precision measurements on the orbit of Mercury and the variable mass of fast-moving electrons. Thus it was falsified and had to be replaced by a more adequate theory capable of explaining the new facts as well as sharing its former success on those tests which it passed. Einstein successfully met the challenge and came up with his elegant theory of relativity, which he conjectured on purely theoretical grounds of symmetry and geometry. The new theory not only explained the new f acts and reduced to ordinary Newtonian Theory within the range of validity of the latter, but also predicted a whole range of new phenomena that were subsequently verified in a equivalence of mass and energy, time dilation and the bending of light by gravitational fields. Although attempts to falsify Einstein's theory have failed so far, it would be established, after the lesson we have learnt about the fate of Newtonian Mechanics.

To sum up, attempts to try and construe science as a set of statements that can be established as true or even probably true in the light of experimental evidence have met with insurmountable difficulties. A view of these difficulties there are a number of ways in which one can respond. One reaction is to accept the fact that induction cannot be justified but to still hold onto the view that science cannot be rationally justified.

This was the viewpoint of Hume, who believed that scientific laws and theories are some kind of psychological habits based on generalizations from experience. Another possible response is to give up the view that science depends on induction. This was the point of view of Popper and others. In either case, the important point is that one's naive conception of scientific method is in need of severe amendment due to inherent inconsistencies.

THE VEDIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE ISSUE

So far we have considered the problem at hand from the point of view of modern philosophy of science. Now let us see what light the ancient Vedic scriptures shed on the issue.

According to Vedic epistemology there are two categories to be defined: pramana and prameya. Pramana refers to the ways of obtaining knowledge while prameya is the object of knowledge. These are further subdivided as shown in the chart below:

The three main ways of obtaining knowledge are direct sense perception, inference (induction or speculation) and verbal testimony. The object of knowledge is the Absolute Truth which is the substance of everything, and its categories, namely phenomenal and spiritual. Only the phenomenal manifestation of the Absolute Truth can be described by mundane science, and even that very imperfectly.

Spiritual reality lies outside the purview of scientific method. This is because the latter relies on sense perception and inference, which are subject to four fundamental defects due to the fallibility of human faculties.

"Because the conditioned souls have imperfect senses and a tendency to cheat, become bewildered and make mistakes, they cannot directly perceive (pratyaksa) these spiritual truths, which remain beyond the conceptual ability of the amterial mind." (Sri Tattva Sabndarbha, by Srila Jiva Goswami).

Again the Vedanta Sutra (2.1.11) declares: "The spiritual reality cannot be understood by material logic or the speculations of the material mind."

We have seen how science is very unreliable as a means of obtaining phenomenal knowledge. Now, as far as spiritual reality is concerned it is completely useless.

How then is it possible to know with certainty? To answer this question let us consider how we obtain knowledge about anything in daily life. Suppose I want to learn a subject like physics of I want to find out about a foreign country. What should I do? The answer, of course is to find a good book dealing with the subject matter and a competent teacher who is an expert in the field. This is an instance of "verbal testimony." In everyday life we learn mostly in this way: by asking someone who knows. Of course we need to put our faith in whoever we are learning from, be it our teachers, parents, the community of scientists or our favorite philosopher. However because all these are also subject to the four defects they can hardly be of any help in our quest for either certainty or spiritual truth. There is , however, another source of verbal testimony which is free from these d effects:

"The Vedas are not the writings of fallible conditioned souls. They are spoken by the perfect Supreme Personality of Godhead." (Vedanta Sutra 1.1.3)

Therefore the Vedic revelation is described as apauruseya sabda pramana, or verbal testimony without human origin. Contrary to mundane science, the Vedas give complete and reliable knowledge of both material and spiritual categories. Originally the Vedic texts contained some 1,130 branches of knowledge on fields as diverse as mathematics, science, music, politics and warfare. In addition they describe spiritual subject matter from the very beginning of the spiritual quest to the highest stage of God realization. Going back to our analogy of the book and the e expert teacher we find that the scriptures (sastras) play the part of the book, although it is not an ordinary book. The expert teachers of this complete spiritual science are the community of saints or sadhus, who have realized its essence. They are also as infallible as the scriptures:

"Mistakes, illusions, cheating and defective perception do not occur in the sayings of the authoritative sages." (Sri Caitanya Caritamrta Adi 2.86)

Therefore it is recommended by Lord Krishna himself that one should acquire knowledge by the simple and infallible process of hearing from such a self-realised person, the guru: "Just try to learn the truth by approaching a spiritual master. Inquire from him submissively and render service unto him. The self-realised souls can impart knowledge unto you because they have seen the truth." (Bhagavad gita 4.34)